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| (c) KyivPost |
Kremlin's attempt to 'convince' Eastern Partnership countries about joining the Eurasian Union project has played a catalyst role for the EU to become more active with the EaP countries. Decision of Armenian government to join the Eurasian and Customs Unions, statement of Georgian Prime Minister that he is "observing" the development of Eurasian Union also echoed the negative development in the region. In addition to that, Russia has already used its traditional punitive methods and put embargo on Moldovan wine. All these chain of events, have increased geopolitical rivalry between the EU and Russia.
A first clear signal from the EU, that Eastern Partnership is an important project for Brussels came from unofficial Vilnius ministerial and Riga Security conference, wherein Polish MFA Radek Sikorski reiterated support to EaP countries and implied on the chances to accelerate the process of signing Association Agreement and DCFTA before the next college of Commissioners take over their offices.
Yesterday, on 12th of September 2013, European Parliament has also voted in favour for the Resolution on the pressure exerted by Russia on Eastern Partnership countries.
The provisional resolution reads the following:
P7_TA-PROV (2013) 0383
The European Parliament,
– having regard to the Eastern Partnership
Summit to be held in Vilnius in November 2013,
– having regard to the fact that Ukraine,
Armenia, Georgia and Moldova have the prospect of signing or initialling, as
the case may be, Association Agreements with the European Union; having regard
in particular to the new, enriched character of association that is at stake,
offering a broad and deep relationship with European partners, and therefore
going well beyond merely economic benefits towards strong political and
societal relations,
– recalling that the 1994 Budapest Memorandum
concerning Ukrainian nuclear disarmament gives Ukraine guarantees against the
use or threat of force and provides for support being given to the country
should an attempt be made to place pressure on it by economic coercion,
– having regard to Rule 110(2) and (4) of its
Rules of Procedure,
A. whereas continuous engagement within the
Eastern Partnership framework has offered partner countries a comprehensive
agenda for pursuing reforms that benefit their citizens, while the Association
Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) between
the EU and Eastern Partnership countries are a commitment by the willing and
able to strengthen and successfully pursue cooperation between the parties in
many areas;
B. whereas the Russian pressure most recently
faced by Eastern Partnership countries progressing on the road to Association
Agreements, including targeted sanctions against Ukraine’s exports, an export
ban on the Moldovan wine industry, additional obstacles impeding progress
towards resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, and security-related threats
with respect to Armenia, which are aimed at forcing the Eastern Partnership
countries not to sign or initial the Association Agreements or DCFTAs but
instead to join the Russian-led Customs Union, which Russia intends to
transform into a Eurasian Union, has put them in a precarious position as a
result of geopolitical constraints to which they should not be subject;
C. whereas the type of pressure exerted on
Eastern Partnership countries, ranging from current economic and political
aspects to the announcement of future economic restrictions, signals Russia’s
intention to continue to consider the Eastern Partnership region as its sphere
of exclusive influence and oppose the prospect of these countries’ closer
integration with the EU via the Association Agreements, an approach which goes
against the principles of national sovereignty, mutual trust and good
neighbourly relations;
D. whereas Eastern Partnership countries have the
full sovereign right and freedom to build relations, as equal partners, with
partners of their choice, in line with the Helsinki Accords;
E. whereas, now more than ever, attention needs
to be drawn to the alarming pressures in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and on
the Eastern Partnership project itself, which is being contested and questioned
by Russia;
F. whereas an Association Agreement with the EU
entails political and legal reforms conducive to strengthening the rule of law,
reducing corruption and securing greater respect for human rights; whereas
joining the Customs Union, on the contrary, does not involve any values‑based
benchmarks or conditionalities, and therefore cannot be considered as an
incentive to domestic reform;
G. whereas frozen conflicts are repeatedly being
used to weaken or undermine the full sovereignty of Eastern Partnership
countries in accordance with Russia’s geopolitical and economic interests;
1. Recalls that the principles of equality and
respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty, non‑intervention in internal
affairs, good cooperation among states and the fulfilment in good faith of
obligations under international law, as agreed in the framework of the Helsinki
Accords, are fundamentals governing international relations among independent
states and, as such, should in no way be infringed upon;
2. Deplores the fact that as the Vilnius Eastern
Partnership Summit approaches, different types of pressure are mounting on
Eastern Partnership countries reaching the final phase of negotiating the
signing or initialling of their Association Agreements; regards this pressure
as unacceptable; believes, furthermore, that the progressive integration of partner
countries with the EU is consistent with their pursuit of good neighbourly
relations with Russia, and calls on Russia to refrain from taking any action
which is in clear contradiction to the above‑mentioned Helsinki principles;
calls on the Russian Federation to refrain from exerting more pressure on the
Eastern partners and to respect fully their sovereign right to pursue their own
political choices;
3. Strongly underlines the fact that the free
choices of the Eastern Partnership countries, which do not have any negative
impact whatsoever on trade with Russia, should not make them bear consequences
such as trade measures, visa restrictions, worker mobility restrictions and
interference in frozen conflicts; firmly rejects, moreover, the zero-sum game as
a paradigm for EU and Russian relations with the Eastern Partnership countries;
4. Is convinced that further political and
economic reform in these countries, based on EU values and standards, is
ultimately in Russia’s own interest, as it would expand the zone of stability,
prosperity and cooperation along its borders; recalls the EU’s standing
invitation for Russia to contribute to this process via constructive engagement
with the Eastern Partnership countries;
5. Calls on the Commission and the European
External Action Service (EEAS) to consider those developments beyond a purely
trade dimension, which is merely a cover for blatant political pressure, and to
take action in defence of the Union’s partners, sending a strong message of
support for all Eastern Partnership countries in their European aspirations and
choices;
6. Reaffirms its strong support for the
initialling or signing of the Association Agreements at the Vilnius Summit with
those Eastern Partnership countries which are ready and willing to do so,
provided that the relevant requirements are met; believes that this will give
renewed impetus to gradual integration and a substantial deepening of
relations, thereby responding to those countries’ European aspirations; calls,
in this context, on the Eastern Partnership countries to continue and step up
their efforts to conclude their current work in the run-up to the Summit, and
not to succumb to the pressure exerted upon them;
7. Stresses the need for the EU to fulfil its
responsibility to engage and to defend in the spirit of solidarity those
Eastern Partnership countries that have been exposed to Russia’s open, alarming
and escalating pressures intended to deter them from entering into association
with the EU, and asks the Commission and the Council to come forward with
concrete, effective measures to support the partner countries;
8. Recalls that the Association Agreements and
DCFTAs are aimed at boosting the competitiveness, economic output and
performance of partner countries and of the EU, while at the same time
respecting the Eastern Partnership countries’ economic cooperation with Russia
in a way that is beneficial to all parties; points out that, as such, the
Association Agreements and DCFTAs do not undermine the long-standing trade
relations which Eastern Partnership countries maintain in the region; believes
that, on the contrary, they should not be seen as incompatible with those trade
relations, and that, without prejudice to the obligations stemming from the
Association Agreements and DCFTAs, any trade disputes should be resolved in
accordance with the rules and obligations laid down in the World Trade
Organisation; affirms, furthermore, that the EU is ready to assist Eastern
Partnership partners in their integration efforts by supporting the provisional
application of the relevant sections of the Association Agreements or DCFTAs
upon signature, unfreezing suspended loans and assistance programmes if the
required conditions are met, pursuing visa facilitation measures and the
prospect of visa-free travel;
9. Points out that European integration commands
majority popular support in the countries awaiting the initialling or signing
of Association Agreements; urges the Commission and the EEAS, nonetheless, to
step up efforts to promote the visibility of the Eastern Partnership and its
benefits among the general public in the partner countries as a way of
consolidating the political consensus regarding their European choices; asks
that in the short term a broad information and public awareness campaign be
developed and launched in the relevant partner countries concerning the nature,
benefits and requirements of the Association Agreements;
10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council,
the Commission, the Vice‑President
of the Commission / High Representative of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the
Member States, the
governments and parliaments of the Eastern Partnership countries and of the
Russian Federation, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the
Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Thursday, September 5, 2013
Ivanishvili on Eurasian Union - Political Immaturity or Deliberate Statement?
With the recent decision of
Armenia to join Customs Union instead of getting a free trade deal with the EU,
once again demonstrated how dangerous can Russia get in the EU's
neighbourhood. Since it became clear that there is a high probability of 4
Eastern Partnership countries – Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia to move
closer to the EU, Kremlin intensified threats towards governments in Kiev and
Chisinau. Method used to convince EaP countries about the ‘beauty’ of Customs
Union and Eurasian Union are classic for Russia and it has been already applied
to Georgia throughout last years. Putting embargo on Moldovan products, playing
with the issue of Transnistrian conflict, manipulating with gas prices,
offering financial benefits to Ukrainian government.. Quite strong leverage for
Moscow to make foreign policy shift in respective governments, as they already
did in Armenia.
In fact, Russia didn’t even need to
threaten Yerevan, as Armenians simply do not have many options. Country is
landlocked because of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey and heavily
dependent on Russian economy. As well as Nagorno-Karabakh issue is very important
and Armenia needs Russia’s backing.. Hence, for Putin it was not hard to
convince Armenian counterpart to abandon DCFTA at the moment when country has
basically finalized the negotiations with the EU.
In this situation, when Russia
is openly threatening Moldova and Ukraine, when they have already managed to induce
Armenian president, Prime Minister of Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili is apparently
“studying” and “observing” how Eurasian Union is evolving. So that he might
consider joining it later. In addition to that, he noted that Georgia has no position
yet about this issue.
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| (c) voiceofrussia.com |
I don’t know how aware current
PM is of Georgian Foreign Policy Strategy, but it is explicit in number of
chapters of this document that European and Euro-Atlantic Integration is a key
foreign policy goal of Georgia. And considering Customs and Eurasian Union as
an alternative, is simply not compatible with even the declaratory foreign
policy goals of this government.
Not to mention that idea of joining these institutions will be largely unpopular among the population of Georgia.
Not to mention that idea of joining these institutions will be largely unpopular among the population of Georgia.
Let me also recall different
researches conducted by the CRRC and EU Neighbourhood Barometer, which
demonstrates that Georgians have highest trust towards the EU within EaP
countries (I’d argue that higher than anywhere else). In comparison with the overall 43 % of positive
attitude in the ENP East, 51 % of Georgian citizens have very positive attitude
towards the EU. With 40 % neutral and only 11 % of negative attitude. Also
based on the same research, most
Georgians feel the European Union is an important partner of their country, and
would like it to play an even greater role in Georgia, across a range of areas.
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| (c) Radio Liberty |
I think these figures say a lot
about the choice of people of Georgia and maybe Mr. Ivanishvili could have
skimmed it once again before making another political mistake?! Hundreds years of historical lessons from Russia,
should have been enough to learn that these kind of statements won’t serve for
the interests of the Georgia. Country, which has been recently invaded by Russia
and which doesn’t control up to 20 percent of its territories. Not to mention
that after numerous endeavours to settle relations with Kremlin, metre by metre Russia
still continues to shift border on Georgian side..
Under these
circumstances, statement of Georgian PM was largely immature, if not betrayal
of Georgia's security and foreign policy interests. I still hope that it
was the case of political immaturity rather than a deliberate step..
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